Re-cognising Disability:
Cross-Examining Social Inclusion through the
Prism of Queer Anti-Sociality

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Studies in medical sociology and law construct disability as anti-productive, unthinkable and unintelligible. This article takes the view, long recognised in the phenomenological tradition, that alternate embodiments result in markedly different forms of human ontology. Enter queer theory. Antithetical to the proposition that disabled people are the same as the ‘abled’, I point to a (trans)difference and suggest that a way out of the confines of recuperative liberal intolerance is to figure the disabled body conceptually as anti-social and ablest normativity as (non)compulsory. I propose that the disabled body is counter-intuitive and actualises, negotiates ‘negative’ ways of knowing or disidentifications. Can queer theory be merely grafted onto the crippled body and dragged onto another inflection?

I. INTRODUCTION

Typically, studies in medical sociology and law construct the disabled body as anti-productive, unthinkable and unintelligible. The dominant discourse in late modernity has been normalisation and more recently, social inclusion. In the former, emphasis has been on modification or morphing to mitigate or to spunk up impairment. The latter, although promulgating diversity, actually induces ambivalent performances that reinforce the constitutionality of a health-not/health binary and leaves the ablest ethos intact. This article takes the view long recognised in the phenomenological tradition that alternate embodiments result in markedly different forms of human ontology instantiating new conceptions of equity. As such the ideas generated in

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this work are not just based on reflections on theory but are processed through my somatic lens of living queerly as South Asian, disabled, LGBTI and Buddhist. Contra the proposition that disabled people are the same as the ‘abled’, this paper points not just to a (trans)difference but suggests that a way out of the confines of recuperative liberal intolerance is to figure the disabled body conceptually as anti-social and ableist normativity as (non)compulsory. Enter queer theory as a moment to rethink ways of living within ableism subversively. I propose the disabled body is counter-intuitive and actualises and negotiates ‘negative’ ways of knowing or disidentifications.2 Can queer theory be merely grafted onto the crippled body and dragged onto another inflection? Halley and Parker ponder similarly: “What has queer theory become now that it has a past? What, if anything, does it not include within its purview?”3 This article explores the reach of queer theory into studies in ableism.

The article is divided into three parts. Part I focuses on the disability problem to bring us up to speed with how studies in ableism denote disability and the problem of inclusion. Part II is an attempt to rewrite terra abled. The somascapes of ableism disallow the anti-sociality of disability as a conceptual proposition. In contrast, studies in ableism can contribute to a greater understanding of becoming queered. A consideration of the efficacy of disability antisociality occurs through an appraisal of the anti-social thesis of queer theory6 and unbecoming3 In Part III the article considers what I term three ‘blemishes’ or ‘rashes’ of disability, moments where there is a considered attempt to invert ableist culture in order to refigure disability imaginations. Rash #1 focuses on Goodbye CP, a 1972 Japanese film directed by Kazuo Hara, which offers a stark portrayal of Green Lawn, a Japanese activist group of people with cerebral palsy, and Rash #2 is a meditation on transableism (self-petitioned disability) in conversation with the film Quid Pro Quo (2008), an exchange between hysterical paralysis (Isaac) and a disability wannabe (Fiona). Rash #3, features Australian activist Katie F. Ball, the Sex Goddess.

3. AFTER SEX? ON WRITING SINCE QUEER THEORY 1 (J. Halley & A. Parker eds., 2011).
II. PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS

The Disability Problem

The civilised person is refined in thought and action. He or she is deemed to live in a reasonable harmony with other, like minded human beings [...] the madman or madwoman rejects society, refusing (or being unable) to cooperate with others, to organise his behavior, or to adapt herself to prevailing norms.6

The disabled body is a site of struggle over its signification and corresponding social meaning. In other words, we need to keep reflecting on the prevailing conditions that not only make the disabled body intelligible but also enable us to refer to disability in a particular way. In previous work,7 I have proposed the notion that disability within an ablest polity should be understood as a state of ambivalence. This ambivalence relates to a perennial uncertainty, an oscillation between the degree of investment one must have in normalcy and the daily business of negotiating alterity, responding to normative shadows.8 The disabled body is profoundly compromised9 and in this sense can be easily conjoined to the queer project. Like the queered body, the experiences of micro-aggression and psycho-emotional ableism10 whilst conjuring onto-thoughts of imminent threat can also act as a sign of vitality and the becoming of the disabled life.11 Transgression does not need to focus on the exceptional; rather a meditation on such encounters enables the activist disabled body to ‘plunge into’ the ordinary as a font of resistance and agency.12 The disabled body is constantly sidelined (even by progressive social theorists) as an axis of subordination and reduced in some sense to a minoritarian protected class amenable to enumerative mapping. Inherent in this reductionism is a progressivist model of development: disabled people along with countries deemed ontologically

7. F. Campbell, supra note 1.
8. See J. Overboe, Disability and Genetics: Affirming the Bare Life (the State of Exception) 44 The Canadian Rev. of Soc. and Anthropology 219-35 (2007).
9. This is a fiction posited under ablest relations and does not necessarily bear any resemblance to the material bodies of individuals.
disabled (the third world) are required to come up to standard, to be improvable. Halberstam provides another angle. Resisting these models of substitution, she suggests adopting “sideways relations”: relations that invoke parallelism rather than any inherent teleology. Behind these processes of developmental framing is the unknowability and unthinking of disability. Given the predilection towards the positioning of disability as overwhelmingly, ontologically negative and provisionally tolerable, this state of ambivalence produces anti-sociality. This model of inclusion assumes that people who cannot, do not, or otherwise refuse to ‘opt in’ will developmentally progress towards autonomy over time. Tendencies toward disability are put out by pathologising desire.

Disability resists a declaration of readability and certainty. The disabled body upsets onto-classifications especially as to the threshold of what counts as disability, normalcy and transient states. The layering of impairment is complex and is not necessarily reduced to categories of primary and secondary impairment as these somatic responses swirl, rise and decline interactively within ablest geographical conditions. Even declaratory counter-symbols of affirmation mask the memory, the legacy and endurance of an ablest ethos.

On being Mad

In earlier work, I pointed to an inclination within ablest thought which invests the disabled body as characterologically suspicious or vexed. It is the disabled body’s capacity to resist fixed categorisation that induces an ambivalent misrecognition. I am convinced that the subject who defies ablest normativity comes to be figured in cultural terms as monstrous or alternatively in the language of medical-technics as ‘mad’ or pathological. As the opening epigraph suggests, madness is preoccupied with mentalities. Madness, according to Sass, is not about mental illness but can be equated with the lack of adaptation and conformity to ablest norms. James Brow’s Sri Lankan work

15. On provisional disability and mitigation, see F. Campbell, supra note 1.
16. There are debates in law contesting reference to imputed disability as a ground for discrimination as well as conditions that have been or are yet to be, or may never be.
17. F. Campbell, supra note 1; F. Campbell, Stalking Ableism: Using Disability to Expose ‘Abled’ Narcissism, in Disability and Social Theory: New Developments and Directions 212–230 (L. Davis et. al. eds., 2012).
18. L. Sass, supra note 6 at 83–120.
on madness in the form of possession as a communal phenomenon is an example of thinking alternatively in its disposal of madness as contained in the individual ‘self’. Each of these mad characters (the anti-social, queering, crippling residents) – everyday aberrants – become undecidable and ambiguous, resisting any enduring attempt at correction and therefore symbolise a transgression of law (scientific, religious and ontological). All claims and utterances of an ontological character become sublimated as incomprehensible (usually through a pathological argument based on capacity), narcissistic (the disabled as vexatious and opportunistic complainers who whine and grizzle at the slightest inconvenience) or are the limit pointed ravings of the madman who exists in some subterranean twilight zone that excludes reason. Testimony and memory exist even when forgotten, and are not forestalled in the geographical consciousness. As Huffer argues: “the thing from the past, now called madness, that remains, in our historical present, [is] radically unassimilable and untranslatable.”

Both Overboe and Campbell point to the toxicity of ableist relations wherein the violence of ableism promotes additional psycho-social injuries.

_The Inclusion Problem_

Disability rhetoric correctly postures that disability is an afterthought bound to an exclusionary ableist matrix that sets the terms of engagement. The working model of inclusion is really only successful to the extent that people with disabilities are able to ‘opt in’ or be assimilated through being countable, categorisable, rehabilitatable and employable. A drive towards self-determination may mean that it is not possible for some disabled people to be truly ‘free’ within the confines of liberalism with its assumptions of productivity and unencumberance. People may lose person status because they fail to meet certain criteria.

Under liberalism, the production and governing of disability is facilitated in part through its morphing into a mere logical and discrete etiological

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24. The battle for many disabled people on a daily basis is re-cognition of impairment within pre-existing psycho-medical categories that have benefits.
classification and ensuing ontological space. The performative acts of the ‘logic of identity’ reduce the disparity and difference of disabled bodies to a unity.\textsuperscript{25}

Certain kinds of aberrancy radically disturb, challenge and support the notion of disability as harm, which interpolates in the politics of disability as an offence and characterologically in turn frames disability as offensive. Ahmed locates what she calls “unhappy archives,” those discourses that zone distinctions of worthiness as to “who is worthy and capable of being happy.”\textsuperscript{26} Because so-called ‘wrong people’ can be happy, this may in fact induce a politics of not only resentment but a claim to return that which is not deserved. For how could a disabled person be fundamentally happy? Surely not! It may seem a drastic consideration to go over to the ‘other side’, to embrace what may awkwardly be termed a ‘disabled’ or ‘non-ableist’ orientation and incur the burden of an outsider status. As I will argue later, outsiderness already exists, without consent, through the high costs of health care, enduring labour market barriers, poverty and discrimination-induced mental health stress.\textsuperscript{27} Another way of viewing disability within an ableist frame, is to see the disabled person as acting as bystander or as comfortably different.\textsuperscript{28}

\textit{The Guilt of Inclusion}

My argument so far then is that the disabled body induces a radical collision with ableist normativity. This collision can instill a terror, the thought that disability can be a more terrifying possibility than even death itself. On the face of it, ableism, in promulgating a state of exception, prompts on the part of abled people\textsuperscript{29} an existence that operates under a permanent \textit{culpa esse}, a feeling of indebted guilt in being included.\textsuperscript{30} This guilt can be heightened when there is a greater threat or awareness


\textsuperscript{28} See R. Campbell, supra note 22.

\textsuperscript{29} To be clear, ‘abled people’ is about mental disposition rather than a different iteration of the materialised body that compartmentalises impairment and non-impairment.

about the provisionality of normalcy. Hence we can speak of ableism operating under a permanent guilt of inclusion.

The political concept of people enshrined in the documents of the French Revolution and subsequent human rights instruments foreground two different conceptions—people as a whole, the social body cast against multiple excluded bodies (the aberrant) or in the alternative, an inclusive whole without outsiders. As Agamben notes:

[...] the concept of people always already contains within itself the fundamental bio-political fracture. It is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a part as well as what cannot belong to the whole in which it is always already included.

Agamben characterises ‘biopower’ as that which individualises through discipline but also massifies, generalises and normalises by making people a population. The incitement to normalise has at its core a process of differentiation (aspiring to the norm that one does not meet). Indeed normalisation hinges on a belief in disabled people being a discreet, insular minority (henceforth contained) rather than being conceived more as a hybrid, fluid, significant component of the bio-population where recognition of such a cohort can de-throne ableist claims to naturalisation. To claim inclusion one must have a permanent under-cohort of the excluded. Claiming one’s own identity must be done always in reference to that from which one is distinguished. The queered project then must also develop potentialities of shame as part of its genealogy. As Wendy Brown observes, discourses of tolerance are engaged as part of a kit in hostility management that gives an impression of inclusion but result in identity management. In effect, bodies become sites for contestation and political concentration.

In scoffing at any move to claim disability as difference or to crip disability in any anti-normalising way, the question needs to be put to disability—has sociality worked? Subverting ableism through a strategy of inclusive normalisation for marginal folk is a somewhat spurious claim. Profiling individuals, flipping between populations is

31. J. Stewart, A DOCUMENTARY SURVEY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1951). The Declaration on the National Assembly (17 June 1789) and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens (27 August 1789) speak the language of national and general will of the people.


33. See S. Ahmed, supra note 26, at 13; See also L. Bersani, Shame on You, in AFTER SEX? ON WRITING SINCE QUEER THEORY (J. Halley & A. Parker eds., 2011) (Bersani argues that both celebration and shame need to be acknowledged. Without such acknowledgement, we are condemning whole communities to death); See also F. Campbell, supra note 7 (on drugs, suicide consequences of internalised ableism).

rather like a lottery aligned to economic markets and political forces. As Bersani remarks: it is "[...] extremely doubtful; that resignification, or redeployment, or hyperbolic miming, will ever overthrow anything."35 Disabled people in 'advanced' economies have had at least three decades of attempts to pass, to integrate, to engage in both emotion and impression management and become the ideal employee and neighbour. Has this sociality really seeped and penetrated into the deep system and underlining ethos of ableism and cut into it? Should we be asking ourselves about the limits of sociality and the personal and health costs of disavowing psychic postures? Indeed is sociality a vacuous or bankrupt concept? Bersani suggests:

De-gaying gayness can only fortify homophobic oppression; it accomplishes in its own way the principal aim of homophobia: the elimination of gays. [...] Even a provisional acceptance of the very categories elaborated by dominant identitarian regimes might more effectively undermine those forces than a simple disappearing act.36

Translating Bersani to disability, current approaches to social inclusion insist on an unhitching of the disability from the person through a re-emphasis on a vacuous personhood without disability embellishments to foreground the (real) integrity of the individual. Person first or 'differently abled' language comes to mind.37 Leaving aside the vexed question of the integrity of disability, disappearing disability diminishes the actuality of the real ontological consequences of living with impairment. Erasure of disability is on 'red alert' because disability as anomalous figure can only be captured "[...] in the disappearance of their meaning, like those Gothic symbols, over the horizon of history, we can only perceive them as the thin shadow case by something as it is leaving."38 Centring, queering disability calls forth a reckoning with the carcinogenic and injurious inclinations of ableism. A re-focus on vulnerability (or precariousness) can destabilise the idea of the sovereign self.39 In the next section I move to re-write the terra abled landscape primarily, though not exclusively, through an engagement with queer theory to propose a living of disability in terms of anti-sociality.

36. Id. at 5.
37. "On why I hate disembodied person first language": My brain is a weapon, a divine spark, and some might say, the seat of consciousness. But can I bring along and offer up my experiencing (de lich) body as well? My body is not a redundant remnant that carries the mnemonic traces of all that has been and the Geist that could be, into an imaginary of infinite possibility.
38. L. Huffer, supra note 20 at 51.
39. V. Das & R. Adlakha, Disability and Domestic Citizenship: Voice, Gender and the making of the Subject, 13(3) Public Culture 511-531 (2001); K. DiFruscio, supra note 12.
III. REWRITING THE TERRA ABLED

[For liminal subjects] [...] style is both the sign of their exclusion and the mode by which they survive nonetheless.40

Terra Abled denotes the not-so imaginary land, a space which designates geography but also a mentality that inclines toward an able-bodied assumption of inherentness and preferability guided by ascriptions of gender, race or caste. Abled cartographies result in enveloping landscapes of deviancy to which all may be subject, hence the requirement to live virtuously under normative shadows through the cultivation of avoidance and immunisation strategies. This abledscape begets a turning/spinning toward the normative exemplified by the theoretical overtures of Wolf Wolfensberger’s formulation of the conservatism corollary which seeks to minimise deviancy affects through the dispersal of multiple stigmata.41 Much of the intellectual traffic for the re-thinking of disability in terms of anti-sociality has emerged through debates about the merits of inclusion and liberal notions of equality and proponents of social inclusion agendas. The critique of the ‘different but same’ stance of social justice formulations has come from ‘anti-social’ queer theorists.42 This section outlines some of the conceptual drivers of the anti-social turn and their adoption for developing an anti-sociality posture of disability.

Leo Bersani43 formulated an anti-social, negative and anti-relational theory of sexuality. These works along with the writings of Edelman,44 Halberstam45 and Muñoz46 set the stage for the decoupling of queer marginality from the liberal projects of tolerance and social inclusion. In problematising sociality, Bersani47 argues that in the radical defining of sociality there may be a process that “requires a provisional withdrawal from relationality itself” in order to be released from a “captive of mind.”48 It is unclear how anyone can ‘be’ outside of relations and by implication disability is called onto question because of its integral connection to relationality. Relationality is not the problem but the terms

42. L. BERSANI, THE FREUDIAN BODY: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ART (1986); L. BERSANI, supra note 35;
    L. EDELMAN, supra note 4; J. HALBERSTAM supra note 40; J. Halberstam, supra note 2; J.
    Munoz, supra note 2.
43. L. BERSANI, supra note 42; L. BERSANI, supra note 35.
44. L. EDELMAN, supra note 4.
45. J. HALBERSTAM supra note 40; J. Halberstam, supra note 2.
46. J. Munoz, supra note 2.
47. L. BERSANI, supra note 35 at 7.
of relational engagement are that "Difference" can become an adjunct to sameness as a form of otherness, which "is articulated as relay stations in a process of self-extension." Before moving into a consideration of how certain conceptual renderings may be applied to the disability situation, it is useful to refamiliarise ourselves with how the neologism queer is marked by anti-social theorists. Lee Edelman's No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, whilst not indicating the parameters of queer, nevertheless concludes that "queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one." Extending that thought, Puar expresses "queerness as not an identity nor an anti-identity, but an assemblage that is spatially and temporally contingent."

A non-Cartesian, assemblage approach to bodies is not new. Buddhist philosophy already embraces an epistemological orientation that could be regarded as 'queer' in its understanding of cosmology and human corporeality in the form of the principle of dependent arising (paticcasamuppada). This ontological principle sees phenomena (material and pneumatic) arise and cease through causes and conditions. As Bodhi puts it: "at a stroke this principle disposes of the notion of static self-contained entities and shows that the 'texture' of being is through and through relational." There is a particularised relationship between conditions and the 'types' of phenomena or modalities that emerge to configure bodies and subjectivities. In their emergence, clipping and unfolding patterns are formed. Here we can be interested in the replication of ableist patterns: "When there is this, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this is absent, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases." Indeed ableist relations of co-dependence can involve co-nascent conditions (sahajata - paccaya) whereby disability and abledness are "animated in mutuality and presence."

49. L. Bersani, supra note 35.
50. L. Edelman, supra note 4, at 17.
52. I should make it quite clear that I am not trying to conflate Puar's argument with the notion of dependent arising which is extremely complex with contested doctrinal exegesis. Buddhism is briefly showcased here in the sense of its persuasive influence on many postmodern ideas. In a similar way, Judaic-Christian cosmology has acted like a wrap of sorts around traditional 'Western' thinking about the human body. For further discussion, see J. Macy, MUTUAL CAUSALITY IN BUDDHISM AND GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY: THE DHARMA OF NATURAL SYSTEMS (1991).
56. Gunawardena & Campbell, supra note 54, at 23.
‘Queer’, whilst originating from the purview of diverse sexualities, easily extends to other kinds of ontological and corporeal aberrancies and ambiguities (such as disability and race). So it is right for Halberstam to embrace a more elastic connotation of queer which refers to “non-normative logics and organisations of community, sexual identity, embodiment and activity in space and time.” From this reckoning, the crip (disabled person) is already queered. In tempering some of the more negative effects of the anti-social turn, Muñoz calls for a queer utopianism that highlights a renewed investment in social theory. A robust queer theory must work on the nuances of differentiation within non-normative clusters.

In a world that makes claims to integrity using the argument based on equality as sameness (we are normal, we are like you, we are everyday people), it is bold to suggest that people with disability are different from the run-of-mill ableist norm emulators. Ahmed points to an alternate prism, a “migrant orientation” to capture a disorientation faced by queer folk which I extend to include disabled people. The disorientation, a form of radical estrangement, propels a lived experience facing at least two directions: towards a home that has been lost (ableist compulsions), and to a place that is not yet home. The task according to Ahmed is to find ways to feel at home and as such anti-sociality can become a counter- alienation strategy. Regimes of ableism have produced a depth of disability negation that reaches into the caverns of collective subjectivity to the extent that the notion of disability as inherently negative is seen as a ‘naturalised’ reaction to an aberration. Certain subjugated desires can, in their unfreedom, cultivate alternate kinds of liberty when labouring under disorientation. Again, Ahmed forcibly argues:

Moments of disorientation are vital. They are bodily experiences that throw the world up, or throw the body from its ground. Disorientation as a bodily feeling can be unsettling, and it can shatter one’s sense of confidence in the ground or one’s belief that the ground on which we reside can support the actions that make a life feel livable.

Awareness of disorientation by people with disability can act as an apocalyptic event to turn away from the practices of assimilationist passing. A key marker of the anti-social turn is temporality – contemporalities and futurity, an explication of the current marginal

57. J. HALBERSTAM, supra note 40, at 6.
59. S. AHMED, supra note 5.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id. at 137.
stance and the vision for the future. The temporal can operate in modes of horizon, vision, gaze and outlook, which capture the inclinations of the imaginary. It is this orientation of predicament and utopianism that can speak to the cripp realm. For disability, utopianism is a conflicted zone. There is no future existence, crip dreaming is expunged and the utopian drive is a device of promise (of curability), hence extinction. Disability is the unwelcome guest at the table of liberalism. As guests we have to be hospitable towards such ‘strangers’ due to liberalism’s civilised comportment. Jose Esteban Muñoz in speculating about the absence of a queer imagination elicits a desire to envision a queer horizon: a utopian hermeneutics where re-imagining futurity requires that “the not quite conscious is the realm of potentiality that must be called upon.”

The distance between imagination and potentiality means that “queerness is not quite here.” A critical insight:

[...] to argue that we are not quite queer yet, that queerness, what we will know as queerness, does not yet exist. I suggest that holding queerness, in a sort of ontologically humble state, under a conceptual grid wherein we do not claim to always already know queerness in the world, potentially staves off the ossifying effects of neoliberal ideology.

In later work, Muñoz speaks in terms of potentiality being a “certain mode of non-being that is eminent, a thing that is present but not actually existing in the present tense.” Hence the characteristics of potentiality are embodied by a sense of surprise and not necessarily expectation and engagement in the processes of reparation. How does a crip horizon come to be dreamed? Living in the now and not yet, as outsiders not quite inside, requires a disposition or habit of contemporariness. Internalised ableism is integrally connected to place, space and context. Hence, Sartre’s observation to reject the interiorisation of nausea: “[It] isn’t inside of me: I can feel it over there on the wall, on the braces, everywhere around me. It is one with the café, it is I who am inside it.” Contemporariness signifies a relationship with the present but also a distance, a critical space from it. As Agamben explains:

Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are in this sense irrelevant [inattuale]. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this

62. J. Muñoz, supra note 2, at 453.
63. Id. at 454.
64. J. Muñoz, supra note 58, at 9.
anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time.\textsuperscript{67}

The queering or crippling of contemporariness is the grasping and holding tight to ambivalence and obscurity which is so fundamental to the alternate lifestyle, obtained through fixing the gaze not on our era’s light but the underbelly, or in Agamben’s language ‘darkness’ which shines into the stare. In this sense, the contemporary queered and crippled person, in touching an elusive imaginary sees the now and the emergent not as a death drive, but in terms of unlivedness:

The present is nothing other than this un-lived element in everything that is lived. That which impedes access to the present is precisely the mass of what for some reason (its traumatic character; its excessive nearness) we have not managed to live. The attention to this “unlived” is the life of the contemporary.\textsuperscript{68}

Unlivedness coupled with the assertion that disability is a productive standpoint from which to explore “a non-identity where force\textsuperscript{69} is made to live.”\textsuperscript{70} Crippling the human involves a differential gaze where sometimes signs and gestures predominate, where there is a different mind style such as Tourette’s or autism or a centring on visuality or tactility. Groundedness to earthiness can be ‘different’ through echolocation, waist heightness and shadows. Halberstam speaks of acts of unbecoming.\textsuperscript{71} Maybe it could be possible to de-ableise, to shed? Through what Halberstam describes as “wilfully eccentric modes of being,” the queering of concepts of passivity normally invoked against disabled people, a refusal to live up to ableist expectations of performativity is articulated:

\begin{quote}
in a performance of radical passivity, we witness the willingness of the subject to actually come undone, to dramatise unbecoming for the other so that the viewer does not have to witness unbecoming as a function of her own body.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

Almost as a reprise to the accusation that disabled people are leeches on the body politic, the pendulum has shifted the emphasis for some disabled employees to hyper-productivity and compliance in the workplace. On the other hand, refusals in the form of an adoption of radical passivity

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\textbf{Note} & \textbf{Reference} \\
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68 & \textit{Id.} at 51. \\
69 & Force of self and a force of relations. \\
70 & E. Stanley, supra note 11. \\
71 & J. Halberstam, supra note 2. \\
72 & \textit{Id.} at 151
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enable the improvability dynamic to come undone, where there are moments of nothingness and non-productivity. Halberstam in her latest work *The Queer Art of Failure* asks: “what kinds of rewards can failure offer?” Turning away from the normative inclination, according to her argument, enables an interrogation of the toxicity of modern living. Radical passivity for disabled people would indeed have to be radical as disabled people live under the enormous weight of supposed passivity figurations. It is a tough ask to claw back and produce a crippled notion of passivity. Sunny Taylor does this in her quest for the right not to work:

> I have a confession to make: I do not work. I am on SSI [social security benefit]. I have very little work value [if any], and I am a drain on our country’s welfare system. I have another confession to make: I do not think this is wrong, and to be honest, I am very happy not working. Instead I spend the majority of my time doing the activity I find the most rewarding and valuable, painting.

Such alternative temporalities disrupt the parameters of the human. Having said this, it is all the more extraordinary that disabled people have not yielded to this repression but have resisted docility and engaged in transgressive figurations of disability. Reconfiguring agency as patience and passion can revitalise thinking around radical passivity. Staring down ableism (because it really cannot be escaped) involves, following Heidegger, an alternate significance (the sum total of equipment, norms, and social roles). Intelligibility shaped through significance then takes on a different culture or form of life. Making room in the world is not about squeezing in, inserting the crip into the polis. The disabled body is already spatialised even in its set-offness and hiddenness. Heidegger indicated that the average compulsion of dasein (beingness) is to obey rules and standards. However, the resolute person who turns away from banality and responds to the concrete situation of taking action, through refining responses over time, can arise from ableism and come out the other side. The disabled person who embraces a posture of anti-sociality, the queering of disability, is definitely a resolute person.

In a similar vein, ableism is founded on a utopian hermeneutics of the desirable and the disgusting and therefore it is, as Halberstam puts

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73. This is not a stance against improvement but rather an attempt to problematise certain performances of improvement.
74. J. HALBERSTAM supra note 14, at 3.
76. J. HALBERSTAM, supra note 40; F. CAMPBELL, supra note 1.
77. V. Des, Life and Words: Violence and Descent into the Ordinary (2006).
it, necessary to inculcate alternative political imaginaries. McRuer drew my attention to the way Halberstam’s perspective can incorporate disability as also outside of the lifecycle.

I try to use the concept of queer time to make clear how respectability and notions of the normal on which it depends, may be upheld by a middle-class logic of reproductive temporality. And so, in Western cultures, we chart the emergence of the adult from the dangerous and unruly period of adolescence as a desired process of maturation; and we create longevity as the most desirable future, applaud the pursuit of long life (under any circumstances), and pathologise modes of living that show little or no concern for longevity. Within the life cycle of the Western human subject, long periods of stability are considered to be desirable, and people who live in rapid bursts (drug addicts, for example) are characterized as immature and even dangerous.

Crippled time can be staggered, frenzied, coded, meandering and be the distance between two events. Crippled time involves getting there on time, running out of time (when there are no accommodations), where it is never a good time (to raise ableist exclusion) and the exhaustion of dealing with ableist relations that are behind the times. Some of our time is shaped according to another’s doing — service time — the segmenting and waiting on assistive agencies. Aside from service time, there is a transient time whereby our crippled selves rub up against biology, environmental barriers and relationality. Like queerness, the lifecycle refuses patterning — there is a different vision with localised goals. Edelman’s take on futurism departs somewhat from Muñoz’s approach in his rejection of futurity and politics of hope. For Edelman, the ethos of liberal modernity is reproductive futurity (especially in the form of the valorised signifier of ☉ child) which is “psychically invested in preserving the familiar narrativity of reproductive futurism.” As McRuer points out, the sacred child of reproductive futurism is innocent and in perfect health. Extending the critique of heteronormative futurity, a queered crippled prism might pose the controversial question: what do disabled people reproduce in the world? This universal inaccessibility does not stop queers and disabled people being positioned as scapegoats.

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79. J. Halberstam, supra note 2.
81. J. HALBERSTAM, supra note 40.
82. L. EDELMAN, supra note 4.
83. R. McRuer, supra note 80.
84. Controversial given the backdrop of seeing disability as a problem has resulted in a perception of disability equated with degeneration.
as a blemish on the future we all supposedly desire.\footnote{My Name Is Khan (Fox Star Entertainment, 2010). The film combines the antisocial sentiments of race, disability and religion and contestations over belonging and place extending to the generative role of being a step parent.} The scene from the film \textit{Music Within}\footnote{Music Within (Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 2007).} where the characters of Ron Pimentel and Art Honneyman visit a pancake parlour for a birthday meal and are first refused service and then removed by police under the authority of Portland’s Ugly Laws\footnote{For more on Ugly Laws, see S. Schweik, \textit{The Ugly Laws: Disability in Public} (2009).} reveals the crippled body as an affront to futurism. After being asked to leave the premises, Art makes a flippant, albeit sexist comment to the female waiter: “I think she needs hot man love.”\footnote{Ibid.} The waitress rebukes this sexualised dialogue by casting out the crippled identity (Art) into a forbidden zone:

Don’t you dare! You are the ugliest most disgusting thing I have ever seen. [Raising her voice so other customers could hear, she continues], I thought people like you died at birth. How do you expect people to eat around you? Normal people shouldn’t even have to look at you.\footnote{Ibid.}

Instead of arguing for an alternative or similarly situated reproductive future, like many assimilative queers do (same-sex families, parents with disabilities), Edelman proposes a politics of negativity, on the basis that queers, as outsiders, as embodied differently have counter-intuitive, queered forms of negative knowing.\footnote{J. Halberstam, \textit{supra} note 2, at 141.} Edelman implores queers to be norm-resisters, to come out from normative shadows and fess-up to futurist ‘inability’: “instead of fighting this characterisation by dragging queerness into recognition, he proposes that we embrace the negativity.”\footnote{Ibid.} Relinquishing the norm as a lost cause enables an outlaw flowering of beingness that is anti-social. Reproductive futurism for people with disabilities is, in any case, a complicated affair determined in part by relations that are not only biological but social. The queered declining of futurity may not be so simple and translatable to disability, given the paucity of a non-ableist disability imaginary; a critical futurity can unlock and release the dreaming and aspirational. The shadow of a negative futurity against the spectrum of real embodied suffering and persecution in the lives of the liminal needs to be carefully apprehended so that any anti-social reworking does not slide into secular eschatology.

Edelman has rightly been criticised by others for his misreading of
futurity and potential linkage with a fascist sensibility. Puar puts out a sharp critique of Edelman’s dependence on reproductivity as the lynchpin of futurity:

By assuming that reproduction is at the centre of futurity and the platform against which future-negating queer politics should be orientated, Edelman, despite his call for an end to futurity [...] ironically recenters the very child-privileging, future-orientated politics he seeks to refuse.

For Puar, it is more useful to focus on a biopolitics of regenerative capacity which already distinguishes populations that ‘decay’ and therefore have ‘no future’, based not on human reproduction, but on productivity or unencumbrance, on “what capacities they can and cannot regenerate and what kinds of assemblages they compel, repel, spur, deflate.” The anti-relationality of the negative turn can be curbed by an orientation towards horizons in a differential futurity. Hence this article is not arguing for the willful residence in some negative posture as an end in itself; rather this stance is to live so as to release the seeds of an alternative horizon, a counter potentiality.

The Perversity and Anti-Sociality of Disability

The existence of disability bios (a proper way of living), puts out fear and possibility. This is the conflict over liminality that many disabled people experience. Imposed margins that erase until one conforms to ableist norm emulation, places where the zones of exception are sub-standard and induce melancholy. How does the person with a disability negotiate the expectations and compulsions of ableism? In other words, do we choose to conform or hypernorm ableism or do we go it alone and explore alternative ways of being? Thinking differently can institute a return to consider the mundane ness of the human body and livability. And in doing so, when does the ‘alternative’ become the new queer normative? People with impairments have impairment – mediated proprioceptive ways of experiencing being in the world. In contrast, there is the unspeakability of communality and commonality where

92. R. McRuer, supra note 80; J. Puar, supra note 51; J. Muñoz supra note 58; J. Halberstam, supra note 40; J. Halberstam, supra note 2; See also M. Foucault, What is Enlightenment? in The Foucault Reader 32-50 (P. Rabinow ed., 1991).
93. Jasbir K. Puar, supra note 51, at 210-211.
94. Id. at 211.
95. Anti-sociality also could incorporate Buddhist understandings of life as decay as a point of transformation rather than the more usual focus on perfection and improvability.
96. E. Stanley, supra note 11.
disabled people can, as Overboe does in his spasms, that “give [him] great joy... [becoming] a life-affirming presence,”97 or as I do in my own heightened sense of smell and breath. On guard against romanticisation, one can take on the guise of the boundary rider smugly wavering in and out of the margins of deviancy. Elsewhere, I argue that “[a]ll these people are in effect strangers in ableist homelands – who because of their strangeness have the possibility of a new vision or orientation.”98 Indeed disabled people throughout urbanised history have carried on the role of the subaltern flâneur who is included in his exclusion and whose defining characteristic is not in the expression but rather in the desire.99

Re-Framing Desire as Emergent not as a Fetish?

Reading ‘disability’ in a positive ontological (anti-social) light requires a priori negotiation with what Foucault refers to as the instrumental effects of the “implantation of perversions,” the consolidation and fortification of tangential desiring.100 On this basis, Foucault’s hermeneutics of desire suggests that a desire towards emulation of the ableist subject mitigates the development of an anti-social framing of disability outside the realms of the perverse. Deviations from ableist sociality are often explained and hence reduced to fetishes, which from the Latin facticio denotes a substandard livedness that is artificial or factitious. The challenge then is to take up these ‘implantation of perversions’, to develop what Foucault calls “the thought of the outside,”101 a thought at the queer margins:

A thought that stands outside subjectivity, setting its limits as though from within, articulating its end, making its dispersion shine forth, taking in only its invincible absence; and that, at the same time, stands at the threshold of all positivity, not in order to grasp its foundations or justification but in order to regain the space of its unfolding,102 the void serving as its site, the distance in which it is constituted and into which its immediate certainties slip the moment they are glimpsed – a thought that, in relation to the interiority of our philosophical reflection and the

97. J. Overboe, supra note 8, at 221.
98. F. Campbell, supra note 1, at 161.
99. S. Young, Morphings and Ur-Forms: From Flâneur to Driveur 2(1) Scan J. (April 2005); F. Campbell, supra note 22.
102. L. Hupper supra note 20 at 23. The translation of an interview with Foucault reveals that much of his research on desire is underpinned by an anxiety for the "mes petits exclus, mes petits anormaux".
positivity of our knowledge, constitutes what in a phrase we might call ‘the thought of the outside’.\textsuperscript{103}

It is in between these conflicted traces of subjectivity that the perverse inkling of anti-social disability, an outlaw ontology, lurks. For Foucault ‘the thought of the outside’ contains a double imperative: (negative) desire reaches into our (disabled) interiority, the emptiness, and the state of being outside: “the fact that one is irremediably outside the outside [...] infinitely unfold[ing] outside any enclosure.”\textsuperscript{104} As a queered cramped man, these preoccupations despite assumptions to the contrary, were intensively personal:

In my personal life, from the moment of my sexual awakening. I felt excluded, not so much rejected, but belonging to society’s shadow. It’s all the more a problem when you discover it for yourself. All of this was very quickly transformed into a kind of psychiatric threat: if you’re not like everyone else, it’s because you’re abnormal, if you’re abnormal, it’s because you’re sick.\textsuperscript{105}

As Felman reminds us, radical negativity is not about negation (as normalisation constantly asserts in its deviancy-making of disability). Rather this radical inclination is about proffering a scandal, saying ‘no’ and ‘no more’ to the injurious ethos of ableism.\textsuperscript{106} It is this affront and turning away that may act as a critical source towards a new disability imaginary, a refashioned horizon.

IV. RASHES AND BLEMISHES OF DISABILITY

Rashes and blemishes can disgust or be seen as ‘matter out of place’. Here, however, I am using this metaphor more fluidly to unfold that sense of being or getting a rash. Of course disabled people have acted as blemishes of history, deemed by Adolph Hitler as “useless eaters”.\textsuperscript{107} Rash (from ME) invokes a rubbing, scraping out or erasure, but also from rasch (from Ger), as being ‘quick or fast’. Characterologically rash, disabled people contrast with the fictionalised notion of disabled lingering and non-productivity.\textsuperscript{108} The links with aberrancy became noticeable in the 1570’s as the ‘savage woman’ becomes one who “forms rash projects.”

\textsuperscript{103} M. Foucault, supra note 101.
\textsuperscript{104} Id. at 154.
\textsuperscript{105} L. Huffer supra note 20 at 23.
\textsuperscript{106} S. Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin and, or the Seduction in Two Languages (2003).
\textsuperscript{107} F. Campbell, ’Refreshingly Disabled’: Interrogations into the Corporeality of ’Disabilised’ Bodies, Australian Feminist Law J. 57–80 (March 12, 1999).
\textsuperscript{108} An example is WHO burden of disease calculations.
Appropriating savagery, we queered crips engage in anti-social traces which blur qualitative standpoint and act as blemishes and strain the inclusion project. This section considers what I term ‘blemishes’ or ‘rashes’ of disability—three moments where there is a considered attempt to bypass ableist culture in order to refigure disability imaginations.

Rash #1: Pathetic Outsiderness

Imagine crawling in a business suit in Japanese public space in 1972. And then imagine doing it today anywhere?

Image 1: Yokota Hiroshi

Hara Kazuo’s 1972 film Goodbye CP (Sayonara CP) is a stark black and white portrayal of Green Lawn, a Japanese activist group of people with cerebral palsy.¹⁰⁹ Hara’s first feature was made in collaboration with members of the group and still shocks audiences with its images of physical disability. Intentionally editing the footage with sounds muffled, out-of-sync voice and image and frame movements slowed, Kazuo’s technique sought to induce an aesthetic of exaggeration. In highlighting the encounter with a perceived ugly body, Kazuo names the anti-social confrontation: “It is difficult to look at handicapped people’s bodies so that’s what I wanted to show.”¹¹⁰ The distortion and crudeness draws the viewer into the profound sense of deliberate anti-social agency on the part of the central character Yokota Hiroshi who walks on his knees because it is faster than a wheelchair. Hiroshi is wised up about the baseless imperatives of social inclusion. In handing out leaflets to people in the street, Hiroshi remarks:

¹⁰⁹. SAYONARA CP (GOODBYE CP) (Tidepoint Pictures, 1972).
I walk slow and look pathetic. What’s wrong with that? ... We are outsiders. We really are. We can never be insiders. Those who think they are insiders may end up being outsiders. Why don’t they realise that? That’s the point we are trying to make. 111

Foucault is correct that we can never really ‘know’ the outside, the liminal margins, because its ‘essence’ remains inherently unknowable and ambiguous. To step outside of the normative trajectories of negativity not only destabilises the conception of disability, it also confuses and disrupts the processes of subjectification by confronting the ‘goodness’ of disability. Hiroshi is emblematic of the anti-sociality stance of the disability. Such an act is subversion because to position the impaired body as queered and atomistic is perverse (see an example of this crippled perversion in Image 2).

Image 2: Green Lawn Member

Image 2 is confrontational. The viewer questions whether the figure of the male has fallen over or is injured. Maybe this is the way that this Green Lawn member ‘rolls’ (ambulates). In either case, the closeness of the body to the ground where the dirt can make him unclean and hence mentally impure, is disturbing. I propose that ontologically the disabled body qua body is perverse, not just because of some difficulties around recognition and the humanist attribute. The emptying out of personality is in effect anti-social in its ‘no-holds-barred’ confrontation.

Rash # 2: Self-Petitioned Disability as Anti-Social Desire?

Transabled people112 have been engaging in peripheral corporealities

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111. SATOMASA CP, supra note 109.
112. I use also self-petitioned disability to denote deliberative capacity and agency; sometimes the expression self-demand [amputation] is also deployed.
throughout history but especially in an era where both cosmetic surgery and cosmetic neurology are commonplace, where humans have become surgically malleable entities, or in the language of Jordan made "plastic bodies.\textsuperscript{113}\textsuperscript{113} Why is it that the transabled or disability wannabes' quest for modification is seen as ontological, legally and morally repugnant even by supporters of gender reassignment surgery? Before proceeding, we need to get terminology out of the way to minimise confusion. The term 'transabled' was first coined by transabled activist Sean Connor in 2004, giving a more sociological connection with transbodies in general. Connor operates a Body Integrity Integrity Disorder (BIID)\textsuperscript{114}\textsuperscript{114} information web site\textsuperscript{115}\textsuperscript{115} and the Transabled page.\textsuperscript{116}\textsuperscript{116} The approach to transabledness or BIID that I have adopted for this piece is that contained on the BIID information site:

BIID, is a condition characterised by an overwhelming need to align one's physical body with one's body image. This body image includes an impairment (some say disability), most often an amputation of one or more limbs, or paralysis, deafness, blindness, or other conditions. In other words, people suffering from BIID don't feel complete unless they become amputees, paraplegic, deaf, blind or have other "disabling" conditions.\textsuperscript{117}\textsuperscript{117}

One caveat to this definition is that BIID is described in terms of a condition or disorder rather than an inclination or stance. Transabled people wish to live in a body that conforms to their body image. They argue that something in their appearance (e.g., a limb, sensation, movement, or sound) should not be there. This is not a belief that the unwanted part is imperfect but that there is an incongruity or otherness to it. As Bridy puts it: "[... ] wholeness is experienced as incompleteness, self is experienced as alien."\textsuperscript{118}\textsuperscript{118} The 'whole' body is made whole by making a 'hole' or dissecting cut. Bayne and Levy argue that the so-called 'healthy' limb or spine is out-of-place and therefore not healthy.\textsuperscript{119}\textsuperscript{119}

Here's the inversion: through the acquisition of disability (the body modification), the transabled person is able to become 'able-bodied',

\textsuperscript{113} John W. Jordan, The Rhetorical Limits of the "plastic body", 90 (3) Q. J. of SPEECH 327 (2004).
\textsuperscript{114} BIID.org, Body Integrity Integrity Disorder, http://www.biid.org (last visited Sep. 15, 2013).
\textsuperscript{115} The ascription BIID is part of the campaign to have this body modality pathologised so as to be included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (DSM).
\textsuperscript{117} BIID, supra note 114.
fully functioning and complete. Plastic surgery already foregrounds that beliefs about the integrity of the body and the notion of harm are historically and culturally contingent.\textsuperscript{120} The assault on transabled quest raises issues about the validity of the disabled body and the conflation of bodily integrity with ableness. There have been extraordinary attempts at closing down this non-normative modification.\textsuperscript{121} The discourses engaged around this issue are deeply embedded with ableist notions, for instances the use of ‘self-mutilation’ rather than ‘self-modification’.

We know that transabled desires offend ableist notions of bodily integrity. Unlike transexualism which is also about significant bodily modifications leading to gender regularisation, the object of desire (amputation, paralysis etc.) upsets cultural concepts of normativity. Transabled people believe they have a ‘wrong body’ but the remedy is that they wish to obtain an equally ‘wrong body’, that is the disabled body! Hence many long-time transabled people, in order to move towards psycho-social integration (transabled subjectivity), have had to profoundly grapple with the forces of ableism and its internalisation and become at ease with disability. This is what Steve, a BIID person I interviewed had to say:

I don’t think about that, what other people think about me or other disabled persons. Being disabled is not a negative thing for me.\textsuperscript{122}

In seeing the compulsion of ableism to rid society of its ‘remainder’, Barry connects his situation with disability in general:

I feel a lot of pressure to conform and be as normal as possible [...] I see society as wanting to get rid of us one way or another so someone who is going to be voluntarily disabled isn’t going to be taken kindly at all.\textsuperscript{123}

There is a lack of appreciation for the complexities behind transabled compulsions. The investment by many transabled people in the disability community and exposure to ideas generated from disability studies has led to the expectation of acceptance on the grounds that many disability studies researchers consider disability to be a neutral signifier and something that can elicit pride.

\textsuperscript{120} See, e.g., Meredith Jones, \textit{Skinlight: An Anatomy of Cosmetic Surgery (Key Concepts)} (2008); Jordan, supra note 113.

\textsuperscript{121} It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the connections between BIID as harm and the famous UK sadomasochism case of \textit{R v Brown} [1993] 2 All ER 75 that defined the boundaries of harm and consent. For a U.S. BIID case see also \textit{The People v Brown} id (Cal. App. 4th 2001). D955066.

\textsuperscript{122} This was a small survey undertaken in 2009 on attitudes to disability and ableism. See F. Campbell, supra note 107. The names used are pseudonyms.

\textsuperscript{123} F. Campbell, supra note 107.
Quid Pro Quo (2008)

Two recent films *Quid Pro Quo* (2008) and *Armless* (2010) explore the compulsions of transableism and also the rippling effect of anti-sociality on ableist notions of health, wholeness and madness. This section of the article will explore *Quid Pro Quo* as the script is undergirded by notions of exchange and dialogue. In this film, the object of desire is negative attainment. The phrase *Quid Pro Quo*, meaning ‘what for what’, already sites the script within a field of problematic relations and conjures a more or less equal exchange or a sense of substitution and a holding back of naming what is at stake. The film plot involves Fiona Ankeny, an art conservator and a transabled woman who desires paraplegia and Isaac Knott a public radio reporter in New York who is ‘paralysed’ by a motor vehicle accident.

Isaac is totally inculcated in the schooling of ableism which proposes that achievement occurs in spite of disability, a difference that through the act of compassion must be removed, should the technology exist. He is stunned by the experience of a different gaze. In an early monologue in the film, a shock anti-social prism is revealed:

I had always gotten stares. You know, the ones people give you, or avoid giving you. But once in a while, wheeling in and out of the curve of people, I'd catch someone looking at me. And I'd see something else in their eyes – jealousy. They were jealous of me, jealous that I got to *sit down* and they didn't. Does that sound crazy to you?  


124. *Quid Pro Quo* (Magnolia Pictures, 2008).
Aware that there was another ground of desire, and through a series of investigative reports, Isaac meets Fiona. The encounter (Image 3) sets some interesting yet contested hierarchies of anti-sociality and also slippages in self-referentiality:

_Fiona:_ People who get off on braces and wheelchair chairs are called devotees. They’re a joke; they’re the bottom rung. Above them are the pretenders. They wear the braces, they push the wheels, but they don’t belong to their chairs. Still, if they want to fantasise, that’s their choice. Then there are the wannabes. You saw how crazy they are.

_Isaac:_ What makes you different than a wannabe or a pretender?

_Fiona:_ I’m a unique case. I don’t want to be paralysed.

_Isaac:_ You don’t?

_Fiona:_ I am already paralysed. I’m just trapped in a walking person’s body... 127

Here we have an interesting assertion through differentiation or through a common strategy of defensive othering. Notice the ‘other’ groups have their anti-sociality called into question in being negated through subordination and trivialisation through an argument of mimicry and fantasy (with the inference of a slip into delusion). Finally, it is Fiona herself who transmogrifies her bodily enactment not as mental disability or delusion, but as one who is already ‘is’, who cannot quite ‘be’ due to a process of entrapment.

The film, a commercial project, cannot get too serious about this kind of instantiation of anti-social difference, and prefers to adopt the cinematic approach of fantasy and dream. Director Carlos Brookes remarks that the story unfolds “[...] entirely within that moment that transpires between deep sleep and wakefulness [...] The film itself should be experienced as a kind of dream.” 128 Yet there are certain ruptures in the script that expose anti-sociality’s raw challenge. The script-writer Fiona Ankeny in a reflection of her different ways of perceiving the world, adopts a cross-species way of reckoning to provide an alternative explanatory framework:

I used to think if aliens landed, and they saw all the able-bodied people, and then they saw the people on [sic] their wheel chairs, they would say that those must be the kings and queens. Because they have special ramps, and they never have to get up. 129

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127. Id.
129. Quid Pro Quo script, supra note 126.
In this explanatory narrative, assumed deficiency is jettisoned. Instead, we get a glimpse into an imaginary of crip privilege. By way of summation, irony is deployed to bring together and present the take on the final encounter between the central characters. Isaac has an unplanned meeting at Fiona’s workplace. The scene is a moment of revelation about shedding the past – Isaac reveals that he can ‘suddenly’ walk (we assume it is some kind of ‘hysterical’ paralysis), and Fiona has made a decision to ‘come out’ and ‘be’ a 24/7 wheelchair user. Quid Pro Quo’s theme of ‘what for what’, a more or less equal exchange, turns in on itself to reveal new possibility. Isaac, in the narrator’s voice, has the final word:

It was a scene of perfect symmetric insanity – the walking paraplegic
pushing the paralysed pedestrian. It was also one of the happiest
moments of my life.130

At the start of this article I alluded to the ableist compulsions to mitigate impairment and mimic abledness. In this brief discussion of transabled subjectivity it becomes clear that many transabled people have had to venture into territories both personal and societal to deconstruct ableist perspectives on the ‘whole’ body and attitudes towards disability. Transabledness remains an affront to the culture of cure because of the implicit desire to value disability. The ‘problem’ with transabled desire seems not to be with desiring as such but the object/subject of that desire, the disabled body. The existence of self-petitioned disability in their engagement with the broader themes of disability studies may not only challenge future ableist normativity but also contribute to a re-casting of crip beauty and law’s arcane notions of ‘harm’. Thus the villains of the disability world may along the way end up becoming crip anti-heroes.

Rash #3: Infractions of the Erotic:
The Sex Goddess – Fucking Ableism

On the question of sex and disability desire, exemplary narcissist Katie F. Ball,131 a disability activist and sexcrip extraordinaire (1966-2004), is an articulate voice. Katie is a qualified secondary school teacher, disability studies teacher and community development worker who regularly

130. Id.
131. WELING AND ABLE: LOVE, SEX AND DISABILITY (SexTV, 2003). Katie is so confrontational that in a 2011 Disability Studies narrative course in the southern hemisphere, the Disability Studies convener was so revolted by the Canadian documentary where Katie is showcased that she removed it from the teaching programme the night before it was scheduled to be shown and instead inserted a video on sexual abuse in human service agencies.
engaged in direct action around the exclusion and treatment of disabled people and environmental causes. In a defiant act she tattooed ‘Sexy, Proud and disabled’ on her head. It is only with the passing of time that have I really begun to realise\textsuperscript{132} that she can be characterised as the ‘Act Up’ equivalent of the cripp guerrilla, a real cripp anti-heroine who attempted to come to grips with the tyranny and terms of social inclusion as well as her own fleshly experience. In her piece \textit{Who’d Fuck an Ableist?}, Ball provides excruciating details about her adolescent sexual and relational journey: 

Denis [another student] was so repulsed at the thought of having sex with a cripp that he started up a hate campaign against me. Year 11 was hell. They called me ‘triple tit’ because I was so fat.\textsuperscript{133}

And:

Talk about close encounters of the ableist kind. I’ve been told by men that my vagina is ugly, that they can’t fuck me because of my disability, that fucking me must be like fucking a rag doll, that they’d love to have a relationship with me but that they can’t handle the sight of by body.\textsuperscript{134}

It is a story that is not ‘nice’, almost nauseating and speaks to the torment of the ableist prerogative. To the reader this self-emptying and offloading of abuse positions Ball as a cripp anti-heroine. Ball dumps historic legacies but does not become subservient. Instead, she reclaims her crippled body:

I’ve had a gutful of being treated like some ugly lump of rotting flesh.
And the worst thing is, I’m not alone. I have long argued that people with disabilities should focus our attention on sexual emancipation. Physical barriers are born of attitudinal ones. When the community can finally accept us as whole human beings, we will be granted automatic access to such things as public transport, education and open employment.\textsuperscript{135}

As early as 1987, Ball was proclaiming that disabled people would no longer “[…] sit back and have their morals dictated to them.”\textsuperscript{136} Aside from featuring in the documentary \textit{Untold Desires} and in Belinda Mason-Lovering’s \textit{Intimate Encounters}, a photographic exhibition exploring

\textsuperscript{132} In clinging to respectability, circa 1980s, Katie was viewed by people like myself and many other activists as a trouble-maker and an affront. She was one who would despoil the acceptance of disabled people and the professionalism of the disability rights movement. I no longer hold to this view and understand that this differential othering I hold to be a symptom of toxic ableist inclinations.

\textsuperscript{133} K. Ball, \textit{Who’d Fuck an Ableist?} 22(4) Disability Stud. Q. 166 (2002).

\textsuperscript{134} Id. at 170.

\textsuperscript{135} Id.

\textsuperscript{136} K. Ball, \textit{Sexuality is our basic Human right}, in \textit{Women and Disability - An Issue} 50 (Women with Disabilities Feminist Collective eds., 1987).
sexuality, disability and body image, Ball established her own web site on disability and eroticism as a strategy of change:

Porn comes naturally to me. It is a profound expression of my sexuality, my creativity and my political activism. People with disabilities are not freaks. We have exactly the same feelings, urges, needs and desires as any other person. Our bodies are just as erotic of those of the super models portrayed in Playboy magazine.\textsuperscript{137}

In the 1990s Katie met and eventually married Peter Vanderfeen and together they had two children. This change of life is indicated by a tonal shift in language which is gentle and replenishing. In claiming her sexual being, Katie says of this union:

Pete and I met on Intro Line [a dating service]. I called him to me and the Universe brought us together. He is the one true love of my life. Pregnant with our second child, I feel complete. I'm happy in a way that I've never been before. This body has finally done something right. My disability is irrelevant where it really counts. I'm all woman. I can give and receive sexual pleasure. I have the ability to create and to nurture human life. I can love. That's what matters in the end [...] My family relationships are the ultimate celebration of my life. I survived incarceration. Now twenty years later, I am giving myself permission to be free.\textsuperscript{138}

This kind of in-your-face queered crip talk risks recuperation through a normalising revisionism. In a radio discussion on the national broadcaster ABC about the exhibition *Intimate Encounters*, exhibition co-ordinator Kierstein Fishburn described an image of a pregnant and nude Ball extended on a sun lounge with her husband Peter and young daughter beside her as a picture of normalised suburban life: “This image shows that with a disability you can have a banana lounge, a garden, a family like everybody else."\textsuperscript{139} Katie Ball refused to collude in sugarcoating the ‘gains’ in quality of life for disabled people since 1981 and believed that disabled people were experiencing ‘cultural genocide’.\textsuperscript{140}

We've made some legitimate gains in terms of physical access but the real problem is yet to be fully addressed. Negative attitudes towards people with disabilities are rife in the community. If we are to achieve


\textsuperscript{140} Ball, cited in Belinda Mason, supra note 138.
any sense of true emancipation, we must fight attitudinal barriers to
equal participation in all aspects of community life. Nothing is really
going to change until we do. Our lives are governed by legislation. Carers
refuse to handle our bodies without the protection of latex [...] Our
bodies remain the property of those who lift, dress and wipe. Women
with disabilities continue to be sterilised and when we’d reproduce,
over one third of our children are removed from our care. Quite often,
our pregnancies are terminated against our will. We are raped by
institutional staff and yet forbidden to engage in consensual sex. Our
finances are managed and our lifestyles are regulated by duty of care.\textsuperscript{141}

In 1998 Katie was awarded ‘Most Daring Action’ award at the \textit{ska TV Activist Awards},
on behalf of the Disability Liberation Front for the gate-crashing in September 1997
of the launch of the Disability Services Directory by the State of Victoria (Australia)
government’s Youth and Community Minister Denis Napthine.\textsuperscript{142} The Disability
Liberation Front continues to this day to engage in acts of civil disobedience.

V. CONCLUSION

The disabled body has been configured as the site of monstrosity
and unthinkability, so inherently untenable that it has on occasion
been pronounced ritually dead. Since 1981, the ‘International Year of
Disabled Persons’, legal and policy discourses of disability have gravitated
towards an ‘equality as sameness’ model, declaring that disabled people
should be integrated into mainstream society and be able to claim the
entitlements of citizenship. What has become clear is that the project
of inclusion has become conditional and normatively vacuous. The
conditions of disability acceptability are about the capacity of disabled
people to morph abledness, be seen to be productive and accept the
reality of the provisionality of their impairment until an obliterating
remedy comes along (technological futurism).

I have noted in this article that the ableism contains an exclusionary
matrix which induces people unable or not wanting to opt in (be
assimilated) to actively\textsuperscript{143} opt out, to adopt an anti-social posture. Using
the insights of queer theory to expose the limitations of the liberal
project, this article has begun to forecast the showing of anti-sociality
as a possibility of disability analysis and lifestyle. Anti-sociality exposes
what is offensive about ableism and as such unveils the exclusivity of

\textsuperscript{141} Id.
\textsuperscript{142} Id.
\textsuperscript{143} This is in contrast to people who are denied deliberative agency and are simply ‘excluded’. Opting out and exclusion are not the same.
ableist norms. In rejecting the terms of the inclusion agenda, disabled conscientious objectors refuse complicity with a system that creates a permanent underclass of the excluded and exacerbates secondary and corrosive forms of impairment. A focus on anti-sociality can expose and rupture the discursive effects of disability toleration. Additionally, a crippled terrain that is anti-social enables the reclaiming of a disability style.